![]() We make use of the speculative window between canary integrity check Program abort due to canary mismatch, thwarting the attack. This vulnerability is not exploitable when the library is compiled with SSP. To write enough payload beyond the buffer limit (>2000B). Maximum stack buffer size is missing, therefore allowing the attacker ![]() Shown in the snippet, in the isolated case when no PLTE (the paletteįound before calling png_handle_tRNS, the length check against The number of bytes copied to the stackīuffer is determined by the length parameter, which is also attacker controlled. The png_handle_tRNS (handling of transparency chunk) function Void /* PRIVATE */ png_handle_tRNS ( png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length ) The stack buffer overflow vulnerability that we picked is shown below. Section describes the stack buffer overflow vulnerability which isĮxploited by this attack through speculative SSP bypass. We discuss our solutions for each precondition in Exploit These preconditions apply to all Spectre-type attacks, including Least noisy option often used in synthetic PoCs is a shared memory area In such way that the attacker can later read the signal (the ![]()
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